From its 1958 origin in defense, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) model for research funding has, in the last two decades, spread to other parts of the US federal government with the goal of developing radically new technologies. In this paper, we propose that the key elements of the ARPA model for research funding are: organizational flexibility on an administrative level, and significant authority given to program directors to design programs, select projects and actively manage projects. We identify the ARPA model's domain as missionoriented research on nascent S-curves within an inefficient innovation system. Finally, we describe some of the challenges to implementing the ARPA model, and we comment on the role of ARPA in the landscape of research funding approaches.
Introduction
In October 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1 into low-Earth orbit, igniting both a space race and an innovation race with the United States. The United States countered with the Apollo Program and a focus on broader innovation efforts, particularly within the Department of Defense (DOD). In 1958, the DOD launched the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) with the goal of helping the United States avoid further technological surprises. Later renamed the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the agency has grown to maintain an annual budget of $3 billion for extramural research funding overseen by roughly 100 program managers (Gallo 2018) .
DARPA is frequently heralded for its successes in funding high-risk, high-reward research. In a commissioned report to celebrate its 50 th anniversary, DARPA highlighted its impact on military applications, such as missile defense and stealth technology, as well as on innovations that made their way to consumer markets, including GPS, the Internet, and autonomous navigation (DARPA 2008) . Historians have attributed to DARPA a role in a number of high-profile inventions, such as the Internet (Newman 2002), the personal computer (Allan 2001) , the laser (Bromberg 1991) and Microsoft Windows (Fong 2001) . Piggy-backing on these perceived successes, use of the ARPA name has expanded to federal agencies outside of the DOD, to include HSARPA for Homeland Given DARPA's high profile, in recent years, analysts have sought to codify the "ARPA model"
of innovation (Bonvillian 2006; Van Atta 2007) , but empirical evaluation of the successes and failures of the ARPA model remains elusive. One challenge for evaluating the ARPA model is the incompatibility between traditional innovation metrics and the lofty goals of ARPA organizations, e.g. "to make pivotal investments in breakthrough technologies" for DARPA, 1 or "accelerating transformational technological advances" for ARPA-E (110 th Congress 2007) . The returns to innovation are notoriously skew-distributed (Scherer and Harhoff 2000) . For a program that makes long-term and high-risk investments, many failures can be justified by a single success. The rare nature of transformational outcomes handicaps formal program evaluation, which is geared toward measuring short-term outputs like patents and publications, or even medium-term outputs like commercialization activity. It is impossible to accurately measure the incidence of one-in-athousand ideas, much less one-in-a-million ideas, on a timescale relevant to political decisionmaking around program authorization. While DARPA has been lauded for significant technological successes ex post (e.g. the internet, GPS, etc.), ARPA-E, a relatively young agency, has yet to be associated with similar outsized wins, making the challenge of intermediate evaluation
Nevertheless, the prospect of being able to orchestrate transformational innovation holds great appeal in the US and across the world. This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a history of (D)ARPA and its younger siblings. Section 3 outlines the elements of the ARPA model in detail. Section 4 discusses what is "ARPA-ble," to help identify technological areas where the model might bear fruit. Section 5 draws attention to several challenges for the model, and Section 6 concludes by placing ARPA-like agencies in context of the larger research-funding ecosystem.
History of (D)ARPA and Its Younger Siblings
Since its inception in 1958 as ARPA, DARPA has had an amoeba-like ability to evolve with new Directors in ever-changing political environments (Fuchs 2010 At various times in DARPA's history, the agency has had many overlapping areas of focus, including broadly-defined basic research, defense applications with short-term milestones and goals, economic competitiveness and local manufacturing capabilities. Here, we provide a brief overview of this history, drawing primarily from work by Fuchs (2010) , which offers a more detailed narrative.
ARPA was initially formed in response to the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik, a major step forward for the United States' Cold War adversary in the space race. As such, the core mission of ARPA at inception was the prevention of technological surprises (NRC 1999) . ARPA was initially tasked with overseeing America's burgeoning space program while the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was launched (Fuchs 2010) . In 1960, with NASA up and running, ARPA shifted its focus from space to high-risk military technology that was not garnering support in the private sector, with the goal of transitioning the technologies from the lab to proof of concept (Roland 2002; Fuchs 2010) . As an independent entity within the Department of Defense, the agency had to be mindful of the distribution of research and development efforts across the military services. Focusing on earlier stage research enabled ARPA to avoid overlap with more applied research and systems development.
Over the course of the 1960s, ARPA developed a flat organizational architecture, staffed with top-notch engineers and scientists from industry and academia (NRC 1999) . Under Director Jack Ruina, office directors and program managers operated with significant autonomy and were encouraged to make use of available tools like "no-year money," where the agency can reallocate unobligated funds to a subsequent year, and unsolicited proposals (NRC 1999; Fuchs 2010) . Staff were empowered to build programs independently, and the agency's direction was associated with the personalities of these staffers and the vision set forth by the Director. During the Vietnam War, however, research was redirected from high-risk, long-term research toward military applications (Flamm 1987) , and ARPA rebranded as Defense ARPA (DARPA) in 1972. Under President Nixon, Congress required that all military funding have a "direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function" (NRC 1999) . With these shifts, the research portfolio at DARPA took on a stricter mission orientation, which continued through the Directorship of George Heilmeier (Roland 2002 ).
In the decades after the Vietnam War, industrial competitiveness and dual-use technologies were prominent in DARPA's focus (Fuchs 2010) . In 1987, with U.S. semiconductor manufacturers planning to purchase the majority of their equipment from Japanese suppliers, 14 U.S.
semiconductor companies came together to create a not-for-profit venture, SEMATECH, to improve domestic semiconductor manufacturing (Fuchs 2010) . With semiconductor manufacturing seen as vital to defense technology, the federal government appropriated $100M
annually for five years to match the industrial funding. The funding was channeled through DARPA (NRC 1999) . Between 1992 and 2000, (D)ARPA returned to having a greater focus on early-stage research. From 1993 to 1996, the agency even briefly returned to the ARPA name, before becoming DARPA once again (Fuchs 2010) .
During the George W. Bush Administration, the agency's focus moved away from industrial competitiveness and dual use technologies to center on mission-driven applied research. Tony
Tether took over as Director in 2001 and repositioned the agency to "bridge the gap" between fundamental discovery and military use (Fuchs 2010) . During this period, the proportion of DARPA funding allocated toward academic researchers declined by 50 percent, though funding levels for DARPA as a whole remained constant (Fuchs 2010; Lazowska and Patterson 2005; Markoff 2005) . In contrast to the discretion given to researchers in the 1990s, Tether increased usage of timelines for project go-no-go milestones that, if unmet, resulted in the termination of projects (Fuchs 2010 in which innovative projects are insulated from the routine operational concerns of the organization.
Much of the discussion about ARPA-like agencies relates to the role of the program manager.
DARPA has a reputation for its flexibility and speed, partially as a result of the forward-looking and aggressive culture of program managers, often described as "100 geniuses connected by a travel agent" (Bonvillian 2009 ). ARPA-E has likewise been described as cultivating an "innovative startup-like culture" with energetic, highly-qualified program directors (Rohlfing, 2017) . 3 Van Atta summed up the importance of the program manager in this way:
The DARPA program manager is, in fact, the key. He or she is the technical champion who conceives and owns the program. He is not told what to do, though he does have to have approval from his office director, and from the DARPA Director. Once he starts that program, it is his, and he makes it happen, and he has to make the choices involved in that. So, in essence, they are risk-taking, idea-driven entrepreneurs heading up their own practice. In this section, we structure our discussion of the ARPA model by highlighting four common institutional features of DARPA and ARPA-E. Although each of these may be adhered to by an ARPA-like agency to varying degrees at any given time, we argue that together they form the core of the ARPA model. They fit into four buckets: (1) general organizational flexibility, (2) bottomup program design, (3) discretion in project selection, and (4) active project management.
Importantly, the last three elements highlight the critical responsibility of program managers within ARPA-model agencies, and each element corresponds to one stage of an ARPA program:
General Organizational Flexibility. Contrary to most agencies in the federal bureaucracy, the ARPA model entails significant organizational flexibility, allowing agencies to respond more quickly to changing technological conditions. Between DARPA and ARPA-E, there are a number of policies and practices that provide this flexibility:
Independence. ARPA-E and DARPA both operate independently from other branches of DOE and DOD respectively. The Director of ARPA-E reports directly to the Secretary of Energy, which allows ARPA-E to operate outside the many levels of bureaucracy encumbering other research organizations within DOE. DARPA is also known for reporting "to the top" with minimal bureaucracy (Van Atta 2007). Indeed, part of the motivation for DARPA's founding was the argument that rivalry between the services led to the Soviets being first to space; after early criticism, ARPA avoided hiring program managers out of the services (Roland 2002) .
Flat organization. Within the agencies, ARPA-E and DARPA both have a flat internal structure. All ARPA-E program directors report to the agency's Deputy Director for Technology.
With an order of magnitude larger budget than ARPA-E, DARPA has only one additional degree of hierarchy with its six program offices. The fact that DARPA only funds extramural research allows it to be less subdivided than other Department of Defense agencies such as the Army
Research Lab, which is organized into directorates each consisting of multiple divisions.
Hiring outside of civil service regulations. DARPA and ARPA-E can hire program managers without being confined by the typical requirements for hiring federal employees or contractors.
This allows them to hire top talent quickly and with more competitive salaries. In the context of DARPA, existing office directors and program managers often "tap" young star researchers they meet during their own work at DARPA and encourage them to consider becoming a DARPA program manager.
Fixed-term employment. Program managers are hired from technical positions in academia, industry, and government, and they typically serve one term of 3-5 years (Fuchs 2010 , NRC 2017 .
This organizational turnover is likely advantageous both for the organization, which receives a regular infusion of new ideas, and the program directors themselves, who can use this prestigious appointment as a stepping stone to top-tier science and engineering leadership positions. Rotation between industry, academic, and government positions is common for leaders in Japan, many of whom believe that the "bounded vision" of for-profit firms and government can be overcome by bringing the two together (Fransman 1993). (Fuchs, 2010) . Identifying technology directions occurs both formally through working groups such as the Information Science and Technology (ISAT) group and informally, through one-on-one conversations and flying out a group of scientists to brainstorm ideas together (Fuchs 2010) .
When choosing an area of "white space" in which to operate, program managers consult with industry and other experts, and they seek to address bottlenecks in the innovation system (NRC 2017). They craft programs to tackle areas where a need exists and where a targeted investment could make a significant difference. The agency's administration may seed this process by hiring program managers from a certain technical background, e.g. ARPA-E hiring someone with experience in geology in hopes that they will explore advanced geothermal energy, but the program directors are then allowed to explore with relative freedom.
ARPA programs are often designed with specific technical targets. For example, the ARPA-E Grid-Scale Rampable Intermittent Dispatchable Storage (GRIDS) program was created in 2010 to support novel energy storage or battery concepts, but a pre-requisite for funding was a cost projection of $100 per kilowatt-hour-a step-change in storage costs that would fundamentally transform the electricity industry. Interestingly, the cost threshold set in this program has become the de facto benchmark for industry costs going forward, as well. 4 The specificity of these targets at the program-level translates to concrete benchmarks for the success of each project, which is critical for active project management, discussed later in this section. These targets also ensure that each program is directly aligned with some component of the agency's mission.
The structure of bottom-up program creation is key to the ARPA model, in as much as it enables ideas to meet mission challenges to be emergent and program managers to deliberately connect people who are otherwise unconnected to shape the direction of research. As one DARPA (Rosenberg 1996) . Research creates new knowledge or information, and so by definition, it is impossible to predict the result of a particular project. Furthermore, even if a project meets its technical goals, there is great uncertainty in how the research will be used and what the impact of that application will be. Regardless of which selection criteria a funding program uses, e.g. scientific merit or applicability (Gans and Murray 2012) , the inherent uncertainty of research presents serious difficulty for evaluating proposed projects.
Given this inherent uncertainty, the most common method of coping with technical uncertainty is peer review, i.e. to solicit opinions of the technical proposals from a panel of expert reviewers, who are presumably the most informed and least burdened by uncertainty. Of course, subject matter experts may disagree, so programs typically combine multiple opinions in order to arrive at a minimally controversial set of proposals. For example, proposals may be sorted on the basis of mean numeric ratings received from the review panel. There exists a vast literature on the deficiencies of peer review for research proposals, such as its biases based on demographics, seniority and, importantly in this context, novelty (Boudreau et al. 2016 ). This bias against novelty is particularly concerning for research organizations that are committed to pursuing transformative research, e.g. ARPA-style programs.
The alternative strategy employed in the ARPA model allows program directors to use their own expert judgment in deciding which proposals to fund. Program managers at DARPA have great latitude in selecting performers and distributing funds without soliciting external peer review. ARPA-E tends to be under greater scrutiny than DARPA-clean energy being more politically vulnerable than defense-and so it has adopted a more moderate strategy of collecting external peer reviews as informational inputs. Goldstein and Kearney (2018a) describes how ARPA-E program directors select projects from across the distribution of review scores, i.e. average review scores are only slightly correlated with an increased probability of selection. The authors construct a counterfactual cut-off line for review scores, below which an application would be rejected by a selection method based on ranking average scores. In the example program shown in 
: Review Score Distribution and Project Selection for an ARPA-E Technical Program
Rather than indiscriminately following the advice of peer reviewers, some program directors report selecting projects based on the review comments instead (Goldstein and Kearney 2018a) .
Program directors at ARPA-E and DARPA often balance programs with complementary, and potentially competitive, technologies, in order to create a diverse portfolio (Fuchs 2010) . To the extent that expert disagreement is useful in measuring the degree of technical uncertainty within a research portfolio, the use of individual discretion in the case of ARPA-E results in a portfolio of projects that carry a higher degree of uncertainty, as defined by disagreement among reviewers.
Moreover, under the premise that uncertainty is a corollary to novelty, individual discretion is an antidote to novelty bias in peer review.
In addition to using discretion to select performers, ARPA program staff take an additional step of actually engineering the teams that submit proposed ideas. At ARPA-E, program directors work to create connections between different researchers with complementary expertise, such as introducing academics to potential commercial partners. At DARPA, evidence suggests that program managers are even more involved in the engineering of research teams (Fuchs 2010 , Colatat 2015 . Berlin (2017) ARPA agencies generally stand out among other public grant-making organizations for retaining control rights over the research after allocating funds. The conventional approach is to allow researchers to manage their own research process independently. This approach is especially well-supported for academic researchers, who value having creative control over their research directions (Aghion et al. 2008; Stern 2004 ). An often-cited model of investigator independence is the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI), which funds "people, not projects" and gives its performers authority to choose their own research direction. Azoulay et al. (2011) found that HHMI performers, who are free to choose and modify their own research directions, publish more high-impact papers compared to similarly qualified scientists funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) with pre-defined project aims.
In this context, reducing the level of authority and flexibility held by funded researchers might be expected to hinder exploratory research (Manso 2011) . However, at ARPA agencies, this loss coincides with the empowerment of ARPA program managers. In the ARPA model, the nexus of exploration occurs first and foremost at the level of the program director, through the program creation and project selection processes described above. The program directors themselves have tolerance for failure as they make decisions, i.e. setting the technical goals, selecting a preferred set of projects, and managing those projects along the way. For this reason, hiring talented program staff with a penchant for exploration is pivotal to the success of ARPA-like programs.
Over its history, DARPA's project management practices have varied between more and less active; broad area announcements and betting on the right people were hallmarks of DARPA in the 1960s and 1990s, while milestones and "go/no-go" reviews were emphasized under Directors
Heilmeier (1975) (1976) (1977) and Tether (2001 Tether ( -2008 (Fuchs 2010) . Throughout these periods DARPA performers have been required to report quarterly on progress. At ARPA-E, program directors also remain closely engaged with researchers over the course of a project, receiving quarterly progress updates and giving feedback on the same schedule (Goldstein and Kearney 2018b).
ARPA-E program directors frequently revise project milestones, budget, and timeline for deliverables; in some cases, they cancel projects that are not able to meet technical milestones.
Figure 3: Budget and Project Length Modifications at ARPA-E
As seen in Figure 3 , budgets and project lengths were more likely to be expanded than to be cut at ARPA-E. These adjustments correlate significantly with overall quarterly status ratings;
projects rated well are likely to see their budgets increased, and projects that miss major milestones are far more likely to be terminated (Goldstein and Kearney 2018b) . By cutting projects short in response to poor performance, the agency is able to mitigate any increased risk in their portfolio caused by funding more controversial projects.
Complementarities. So far in this section, we have outlined the four practices related to organizational structure, program design, project selection and project management that are the hallmarks of the ARPA model. Together these choices lodge much more control and decisionmaking power with the funding organization than is typical for public research funders. We 
What is ARPA-ble?
In the previous section, we described four elements of the ARPA model and proposed that these four are complements with respect to empowerment of the program staff. The obvious next question is: when should this particular set of research management practices be chosen over another?
In short, what is ARPA-ble? We draw attention here to three important characteristics of a research area that determine whether it is appropriate for an ARPA-like agency: the presence of a clear mission, the type of research being conducted, and the status of the broader innovation system within which technology is researched, developed and deployed (Figure 4 ). Mission Orientation. The first requirement for an ARPA-ble challenge is that it must be possible to organize the domain of research around a technology-related mission or a set of overarching goals. According to Sen (2013) , transformational innovation programs are targeted specifically toward desired social or economic outcomes, rather than intangible goals or undefined technical development. The ARPA model is not appropriate for so-called basic research, which "is performed without thought of practical ends" (Bush 1945 ) and is far upstream from any commercial activities, e.g. high energy physics.
DARPA and ARPA-E both have specific missions.. In the case of DARPA, the agency's mission is to advance technologies that could be critical to national security. In the case of ARPA-E, the agency's mission, as codified in statute, is to enhance energy security through the reduction of energy imports, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and increasing energy efficiency throughout the economy. An ARPA agency's mission is the foundation of the program design process described in Section 3, in which a program manager seeks a particular innovation or technological change. He or she then uses active project management to guide the pursuit of breakthroughs to enable this change (Carleton 2010) . Bonvillian (2009) calls this type of challengebased model "right-to-left," in that it moves opposite the archetypal innovation pipeline, starting with a desired technology and working backwards to determine the research needs.
Mowery (2006) argues that in addition to a "clear mission" DARPA having the military as its "single customer" is essential to the agency's success. However, in contrast to the early years of DARPA, the military is no longer the primary customer for many of the technologies it needs, such as computers or microprocessors. As such, DARPA itself has had to find ways to influence technology directions in technologies critical to the military, but in which the military is only a very small fraction of overall demand. The military's clear mission is therefore more important to DARPA's function than the military's role as a customer.
It is important to note that not every technical area united by a specific mission or challenge is a good fit for the ARPA model. The mission must be associated with quantifiable goals and sub-goals with trackable progress metrics. Technical pursuits like the NIH BRAIN Initiative, with the goal of "revolutionizing our understanding of the human brain", 5 may not be a good fit for an ARPA model organization, as the degree to which scientists understand the human brain is not practically measurable. Similarly, agencies such as the Department of Energy's Office of Science that pursue "blue sky" or basic research, for which sub-goals are often hard to define, are ill-suited for the ARPA model. We turn to this topic in our next section.
Nascent S-Curve. From the discussion of mission orientation, it is apparent that ARPA-ble research is distinct from basic research-and yet it is also distinct from so-called applied research, which is geared toward performance improvement of existing technologies. The ARPA model's emphasis on risk-taking and novelty make it a poor fit for a program focused on extending an existing technological paradigm. But if ARPA agencies do neither "basic" nor "applied" research, then how can we describe their function?
Recent research by Goldstein and Narayanamurti (2018) suggests that ARPA-E occupies a productive middle ground between basic and applied research. ARPA-E awards have a higher rate of patenting and the same or higher rate of publishing than similar awards from other branches of the Department of Energy, which are sharply divided between "basic" and "applied". ARPA-E awards are also more likely to produce both a patent and a publication, indicating an openness to both invention and discovery. Relatedly, soon after its founding, DARPA began to emphasize the transition of technology out of the laboratory and into the hands of users or producers who would bring it to full adoption (Roland and Shiman 2002) . This role of ARPA-like agencies in bridging the gap between basic and applied research is our second distinguishing characteristic of ARPAble challenges.
One way to define the ARPA domain takes advantage of the concept of technology S-curves by Foster (1986) , where technical performance tends to improve as a sigmoidal function of research effort. Individual technologies progress along an individual S-curve, with occasional discontinuities resulting from a radical breakthrough and creation of a new S-curve. The beginning of an S-curve represents a novel concept that has not yet been the focus of much effort. Here, the returns to effort are small. The middle portion of the S-curve includes the inflection point where the returns to effort are highest. The final segment of the S-curve entails diminishing returns to effort and slow improvements to technical performance.
It seems that the ARPA model is optimized for technical areas that reside in nascent S-curves -the technology exists, is relatively unexplored, and has great potential for improvement. The practice of program design identifies those areas; the practice of project selection finds uncertain but promising research efforts in pursuit of the specific technical challenge; and the practice of project management focuses effort as more information becomes known and some ideas begin to show more potential than others. Organizational flexibility gives the agency the ability to quickly respond to opportunities with minimal administrative friction.
We can also consider the ARPA agencies in the taxonomy introduced by Stokes (1997) , in which research activities are divided across two dimensions: whether the use is considered, and whether fundamental understanding is the goal. In this framework, research is either purely basic drugs where a start-up will develop a drug through early stages of clinical trials, and then more established firms will buy out the start-up for further commercialization (Goldstein et al. 2017 ).
In the defense industry, there are a separate set of frictions that impede the commercialization process. National security is a public good with an associated collective action problem whereby there will be chronic underinvestment in mission-critical innovation. In addition, if a firm does produce an innovative product for the defense department, that product could be subject to secrecy requirements, whereby the firm may be unable to repurpose the product in other industries or abroad. While DARPA performers themselves do not typically have military clearances, DARPA program managers can require sensitive information to connect their funding decisions to specific military needs.
Challenges for ARPA-like Agencies
Even in areas where the ARPA model is a good fit, there remain challenges that must be overcome to maximize the effectiveness of the model:
Measuring long-term transformation. The mission of an ARPA-like agency often involves transformation of some industry or market to address a societal need. This transformation invariably occurs over the long-term, and yet, the ARPA model requires that individual projects be held to strict timelines; projects often only run for three years. In the case of ARPA-E, for example, a project that aims to create a new design for an energy storage device may be a tremendous success, and still the impact in the market and/or the environment will not be seen for decades. This limitation must be kept in mind during short-term efforts by Congress or the agency itself to measure the agency's progress toward its mission.
One size does not fit all. ARPA model organizations fund a diverse set of performers, including large firms, academics, start-ups and national labs. They generally have one set of practices that apply equally to all research teams, despite the very different incentives and organizational contexts underlying participation across these different types of performers. Successfully implementing the ARPA model means navigating these differences to avoid conflicting motivations for researchers.
The dark side of discretion. In the ARPA model, program directors have significant freedom to craft programs and select and manage projects, and the Director also enjoys freedoms afforded by the organization's flexibility. As more freedom is given to both the Director and the program staff, the quality of the agency's activities are increasingly dependent on the talent of these individuals.
Any research agency requires a Director with strong leadership ability and staff members with high with appropriate care, the agency can lose its reputation as a trustworthy partner (Fuchs, 2010) .
The agency must cultivate a healthy relationship with the research community in order to maintain a steady influx of ideas.
Nurturing culture with high turnover. An energetic and enterprising culture is a hallmark of the ARPA model. However, culture is a byproduct of the individuals that make up the organization, and in ARPA-like agencies, the program directors work on three-year contracts. It is a challenge to maintain and nurture an organization's culture with such high turnover. Nonetheless, there are a few mechanisms for perpetuating a culture of risk-taking and exploration: first, in the program creation process when new program directors pitch their ideas to existing program directors and the agency's administration, and second, when the program directors meet again with the administration to justify their selections of which proposals to fund. The alumni networks of program directors also help to maintain the reputation and culture of the organization.
Transitioning to market. The focus of the ARPA model is on making progress along technical S-curves, but innovation also requires diffusion of new technologies. Overseeing the transition from research to development is a major challenge for ARPA-like agencies, especially when there is no public customer for the innovation. ARPA-E has a "tech-to-market" team dedicated to working with all performers on their strategy for transitioning technologies out of the lab, and yet a recent assessment by a committee of the National Academies found that this program should be "reconceptualized" (NRC 2017).
Conclusion
In this paper, we review the key elements of the ARPA model for research funding: organizational flexibility on an administrative level, alongside significant authority vested with program directors to design programs, select projects and actively manage projects. We identify the ARPA model's domain as mission-motivated research on nascent S-curves within an inefficient innovation system. We also describe some of the challenges to implementing the ARPA model.
It is important to note that the ARPA model is but one part a landscape of research funding programs, each with different goals and accordingly different approaches. In Figure 5 
